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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this work is to enhance the understanding of command and control in collectives, paying 
particular attention to coalition situations when multiple, typically autonomous agencies are expected to work 
together harmoniously. There are two different approaches to dealing with commands, one approach focuses on 
individual command components and the other studies the interplay between different commands. This paper is 
a first attempt at bringing these two views together, with the aim of understanding what is needed for human 
autonomous systems to work as collectives through command and control systems that achieve their full 
capability through “command by intent”, while also encouraging and encompassing new agile behaviour both at 
the individual and organizational level. We have identified key aspects of commands in collectives (both from 
existing literature and from our own work) and demonstrate our findings in case studies taken from hurricane 
Katrina, 1995 Oklahoma city bombings, the 2001 attack on the Pentagon, as well as some incidents of lower 
complexity, such as an oil spillage on a motorway. 
Key Words 
Command by intent, command and control, collectives, multiple agencies, disaster response 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper aims at aiding multiple agencies collaboration during emergency crisis response management. It is 
known that this collaboration is difficult due to, amongst other factors, different command structures and 
different organizational process.  
When disaster strikes, many different organizations, which under other circumstances work alone, are thrown 
together and would ideally work harmoniously as one, though in practice this is near impossible. This poses 
many difficulties, as typically the individuals belonging to an organization have been trained within that 
organizational structure, understand that particular organizational doctrine, and joint training is not seen very 
often. During this collaboration the organizations must focus on information sharing (which poses its own 
problems), collaboration and coordination. Work in this direction has already been initiated by Brehmer (2011) 
who established a new concept of command and control (C2) called Harmonization of Efforts. This aims at 
situations in which several organizations who typically operate autonomously are somehow involved. A central 
command is not available in such circumstances and Harmony of Efforts is what the present authors call the 
capability of the system, the maximum a collective could achieve (collectives for the purpose of our work are 
aggregations which can contain a mixture of humans, autonomous systems, organizations, etc.). The lack of a 
commander in these circumstances makes it particularly difficult to achieve “mutual support”. Brehmer’s 
Harmony of Effort is decomposed into three parts: the “spirit” in which C2 should take place, the method to be 
used and what C2 is about. Brehmer uses, as motivation for Harmonization of Efforts, studies conducted over 30 
years in UN peace support operations, in these operations unity of command and unity of effort is inappropriate. 
The type of situations we have observed in the case studies, also have as maximum capability Harmonization of 
Efforts, and we will mention reasons why it is/is not achieved. 
There are two main streams to modeling command. What we call a higher conceptual level approach considers 
command itself and the impact of one command on another, this approach does little in the way of 
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understanding the details of a single command, but provides accurate and complete models for understanding 
command interactions. Prominent examples of this are given by Kalloniatis work (2008) which aims to 
understand the synchronization of commands, and also by some military descriptions of the nature of command 
(Hayes and Alberts 2006; ), (Moffat 2011). The other approach is at a lower conceptual level, typically a 
grammatical decomposition of elements of command. These grammatical models accurately depict a single 
command, but fail to encompass the broader notion of a command itself and so cannot be used to accurately 
describe how different commands come together and what causes different commands to be issued at in 
different situations. Focusing on a “single” command is unrealistic as command and control always happen in a 
broader setting where commands impact and are impacted by other aspects of the system. An encompassment of 
these two views will be crucial to our understanding of what are the central notions in defining commands in 
collectives. To understand commands in a collective setting consequently requires us to understand how to 
achieve “command by intent”. Commander's intent is defined by the U.S. Department of Defense as “a clear and 
concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the desired military end state that supports mission 
command, provides focus to the staff, and helps subordinate and supporting commanders act to achieve the 
commander’s desired results without further orders, even when the operation does not unfold as planned.” The 
ability to command with intent welcomes new methods by allowing a command to be passed in a generic “what 
to do” as opposed to a specific “how to do it”. Understanding command by intent requires a structure (not 
necessarily hierarchical) of intent that demonstrates the causal dependency relation between different 
components, and a formalization that allows for improvisation points and novel behaviours to be apparent. 
Another point is that the collectives observed during emergency response are entirely or partially dynamic, from 
rights of decisions to the nature of command itself, these are constantly evolving. The dynamic nature of 
command approaches is encompassed in many models but what they miss is the addition of the learning nature 
of the system itself, not just at the individual but at the collective level, of for example how a collective learns to 
recognize a novel expression of command and what it means. This paper proceeds as follows: first we highlight 
relevant literature, then give a workable Research Question of what command in collectives needs to encompass, 
then we proceed to exemplify these with case studies of varying complexities, and we conclude with a summary 
re-visiting our Research Question about commands in collectives, given the insight gained from the case studies. 
RELEVANT LITERATURE 
We have observed that models of command and control can be classified according to their level of conceptual 
abstraction; at the highest level are mathematical models describing the interactions between different 
commands and at the lowest level decompositions of individual commands. Figure 1 provides the reader with a 
perspective as to where each model of command lies in our conceptual space. What we mean by less abstract is 
that they are closer to being “just a grammatical decomposition”, closer to dealing with what is being modeled, 
with actual commands, and so at this “level” it is possible to talk about aspects of commands. Seeing as the 
ability to “command by intent” has recently gained military focus, and is one of the areas we explore in this, the 
reader will find in green, areas that are able to incorporate intent in their models of command. What we mean is 
that in these models, for example in grammatical decompositions of command, intent is dealt with, these models 
are able to incorporate the notion of intent in them, whereas the mathematical levels, which are much more 
abstract are not, these models treat commands as abstract objects and are thus unable to incorporate a lot of 
aspects of real commands. 
 
Figure 1. Conceptual Space of Command Models 
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Starting from the highest level of conceptual abstraction, Kalloniatis (2010) studies the mathematics behind a 
system’s ability to achieve self-synchronization. This is a key concept to coherent, robust behaviour observed in 
collectives (for example animal collectives see (Couzin, 2009)). It is interesting to note that even with a strictly 
mathematical view, the author observes, through simulations, the existence of an intermediate step, between 
incoherence and synchronization. In those cases the networks showed periodic behaviours. If we see collectives 
as incoherent systems that on some occasions synchronize, then since this synchronization is crucial to 
achieving command by intent (Moffat, 2010).  This must be present in non-linear descriptions of command and 
collective behaviour (by non-linear we mean not a “single command” and not the grammar of a command).  
Kalloniatis (2008) applies the theory of self-synchronization to C2. This work is interested in modeling 
interaction between different C2 approaches and even though this coincides with the higher level view of 
command, his models do allow for the distinction of “time scales and interactions between individual processes”. 
This work is based on the (well established) Kuramoto model (created to study synchronization in systems); the 
work alters and interprets Kuramoto’s model to describe intra-node interaction within C2 processes. The model 
is interested in the transition from incoherence to synchrony and it copes with the notion of partial synchrony: 
some elements in the system form synchronous “clusters” while the remaining behave randomly with respect to 
these clusters. Kalloniatis (2008) argues that C2 naturally happens in cycles, e.g. Boyd’s (1987) Observe-Orient-
Decide-Act (OODA) loop. There are two notions which are abstracted in terms of synchronizable processes: the 
winning team will outpace the enemy’s OODA loop and within each team’s command system, all decision 
cycles must synchronize with respect to time and so that decisions interdependent on each other don’t occur in 
parallel. Another example is given by MAP (Military Appreciation Process) sequence: Scoping -> Mission 
Analysis -> Course of Action Development -> Course of Action Analysis -> Decision -> Execute. Alberts and 
Hayes (2006) add to this by discussing ways to measure the quality of command through measurement of 
quality of intent, the quality of information passing. Albert and Hayes also acknowledge the limitations with this 
approach, for example the quality of intent might be limited by its expression and its degree of acceptance.  
Synchronization depends on political, social, adversarial and environmental constrains. MAP and OODA loops 
are mapped as continuous circular decision loops which need to synchronize, both locally and across networks. 
Brehmer (2006) introduced the concept of a Dynamic OODA (DOODA) loop, this model incorporates 
sensemaking, planning and information gathering. Synchronization has clearly been well studied with regards to 
command. Moreover with regards to abstract networks, from a mathematical, sociological and psychological 
point of view, many aspects have been thoroughly thought-out. Most of these describe behaviour that should be 
taken into account when dealing with command and control systems. An important point is to be able to predict 
when command clashes will occur stopping systems from reaching their full capability. Once we have 
understood commands as decomposable structures in terms of intentions, goals, commands and methods we can 
begin to understand how these elements might be in conflict. 
Finally, we begin our exploration of current models of command from a lower conceptual level of abstraction, 
i.e. those that try to understand individual commands and what comprises them. Examples can be found in the 
development of battle management language (Hieb and Schade 2007) or the C2 grammar (Hieb and Schade 
2008). Hiebe and Schade have a formalism for C2, termed the Command and Control Lexical Grammar (C2LG), 
they focus on trying to define a formal and unambiguous language, which can facilitate military communication 
amongst human and machine agents. Their grammar is broken down into two grammars: a “tasking grammar” 
and a “reporting grammar”, these are then used to express command by intent. Hieb and Schade (2008) 
decompose command by intent in terms of Purpose, Key Tasks, End State. Hieb and Schade (2008) define, the 
Command and Control Lexical Grammar (C2LG), in which their aim is to give a formal and unambiguous 
language which can facilitate military communication amongst human and machine agents. They develop a 
“tasking grammar” and a “reporting grammar”, and then use these to express command by intent. Command by 
intent is decomposed in terms of Purpose, Key Tasks, End State.  The basic order expression is composed of a 
tasking verb (JC3IEDM’s table “action-task-activity-code”, for example defend, attack) and its frame (the form 
being Verb Tasker Taskee (Affected|Action) Where Start-When (End-When) Why Label (Mod)*) where Mod is 
a place where any additional information can go, this is also present in reporting expressions. In (Alberts and 
Hayes 2006) it is understood that the acquisition of command can happen “whether by law, regulation, practice, 
role, merit, or force of personality”. And the styles of organizations involved in command will impact it, by 
styles it is meant experience, risk taking, use of power and force, diplomacy, ethics, norms, morale, creativity, 
unorthodox behaviour. Moreover, “Command and Control does not encompass all of the decisions made by 
individuals or organizations nor all of the decisions that emerge from collective behavior; only the ones directly 
associated with the functions of C2.” We will use this to hypothesise on the importance of a clear understanding 
of the doctrine and goals, intents at the organizational level when issuing commands in coalition environments. 
Some progress has also been made by Gustavsson, Hieb, Moore, Eriksson and Kiklasson (2011) which provides 
a model that encompasses intent and effects together with a formalism that can be read by machine and humans. 
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The formalism is similar to the battle management language but crucially it incorporates intent and effects, it is 
described in Lexical Functional Grammar (LFG) and we now briefly discuss its components. Intent is 
decomposed as: Goals, End state, Sequence, State, Key decisions, Anti-goals, Constraints, Expressives (cultural 
and doctrinal behaviors). For this work state is broken into physical state, cognitive state and status state, similar 
to different domains as specified by Moffat (2011). There is, however, a classification difference in these two 
views: Moffat views these as part of a hierarchical structure, whereas Gustavsson et al. (2011) see them all at the 
same level, so they define a linear structure.  
A different, but related area to command modeling, is that of command analysis. So far we have looked at 
theoretical models of commands. We now look at how to analyse commands as they occur during emergencies. 
Trnka and Johansson (2009) present documented practice of commanders responding to emergencies. They used 
episodic analysis, socio-metric status and communication roles for their analysis and found that commanders use 
informal and innovative communication means, this is in accordance with what we have found in our case 
studies (to be described at a later section). An interesting point made here is the cross-organizational knowledge 
as an important factor for coordination, which again formalizes what we found with our own case studies. A 
slightly different take on improvisation can be seen in the work by Rankin, Dahlbäck and Lundberg (2011) this 
time dealing with “improvised roles” (which we have found in one of our case studies, see (Montoya 2007)).  In 
this work, the authors aim to understand improvisation by analyzing a case study of crisis management response 
collective “as they work” and looking deeply into information and communication of individuals with 
improvised roles. An interesting approach to understanding failures in disaster management is given by Bosse, 
Hoogendoorn, Jonker and Treur J (2008) where they conduct empirical analysis on nonmonotonic reasoning 
processes in the context of incident management, trying to understand how people reason under pressure. The 
authors provide a generic formalization of how people reason towards an interpretation. Simulations were tested 
against empirical results and found to be adequate. 
COMMAND IN COLLECTIVES 
We will now describe crucial aspects necessary for successful command during coalition situations. Our thesis 
is that (at least) these elements must be present for a successful command and control system during emergency 
response. Our claims are inspired by literature as well as original thinking and reinforced by case studies of 
varying complexities. We will look at: 
• Human Bias (since this is sufficiently self-explanatory, we leave this analysis to the Case Studies 
section only). 
• Flexibility. 
• A (lack of) understanding of the interplay between: different commands, different elements of different 
commands (broken down further and parts given by case studies, parts left as theses). 
• Temporal classification of command (case studies), communication structures (literature), sensemaking 
(literature) 
• A structure of intent (theoretical work). 
• A (lack of) understanding of organizational doctrine, house rules (which we define as expected ways of 
achieving certain goals, carrying out certain instructions) and organizational and individual culture 
(broken down and parts given by case studies, parts left as theses). 
 
We will briefly take each of these and explain in greater detail. Before we go any further it seems sensible to 
inform the reader that we are taking a very elementary way to judge whether a command is a failure or a success. 
A failure is given by a command that does not satisfy the local requirements imposed by the situation and 
understood by the stakeholders. Successful commands for our purposes are those commands that are not failures. 
The case studies chosen were such that they fitted this very obvious criteria, we are aware that more 
sophisticated approaches could have been taken to explicate varying complexities of “good/successful” or 
“bad/failure” commands; but that is beyond the scope of this paper. This is left for future work after we have 
understood these in the basic level we have done in the cases outlined. Before we proceed any further it is 
necessary to explicate that by command in collectives we mean commands taking place in a large system, a 
collective which could encompass organizations and individuals (as well autonomous entities), that are involved 
in the same situation (we deal only with disaster response management) whether explicitly stated or not. This is 
in contrast with a collective of commands, meaning several commands. Another concept that is important to us 
is that of flexibility, by which we mean resilience to change. The capacity for collectives to adapt to nouveau 
behaviour is not always present and it is essential in establishing successful command structures, capable of 
adapting to new situations and unexpected changes. This kind of resilience should be a crucial consideration in 
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collaborations and in the development of new technologies for crisis management.  
In keeping with our desire to integrate higher and lower conceptual descriptions of command, we hypothesise 
that a lack of understanding of the interplay between: different commands, different elements of different 
commands, commands and elements of other commands are amongst the underlying causes of failures, such as 
communication breakdowns. By elements of a single command we mean the usual understanding of what 
comprises a command: a mission statement, goals, anti-goals, time constraints, commander’s intent, explicit 
method for achieving certain goals. We formulate that the better the structure of the overall system and 
understanding of different elements, the less the need for “explicit methods” for achieving goals and the higher 
the level of “command by intent”. By system we mean the entire collaboration effort which includes all the 
stakeholders involved. 
A structure of intent in an attempt to make clear what is absolutely essential to be satisfied for successfully 
commanding collectives. A “single” intent comprises several different levels of intention, and these need to be 
explicit, not necessarily hierarchically. The structure must contain causal dependency relations between the 
(visible)1 intentions that comprise the intent being structured. Specifying what formalism the structure should be 
presented in is beyond the scope of this paper; this will depend, amongst other factors, on doctrine and culture of 
organizations involved. For a very simple example of how one might consider the different intentions 
comprising a single intent, consider the intent “to make you watch film X”. I can break this down into “I intend 
for you to watch film X”, “ I intend to take you to the movies and see film X” amongst others. If I borrow that 
movie from a neighbor and lend it to you than one of the intentions was satisfied but not the other. Suppose the 
author of this intent structure wished for two things: 1-) for you to see that film and 2-) for you and him/her to 
watch it together at the movies. Then he/she should have put a dependency relation on these conditions so that 
you had to watch the movie and he/she had to be present and it had to be at the movies, that way if you watched 
the movie alone the intent was not satisfied, because one of the dependencies was broken. 
Another necessary condition to command collectives of human and autonomous systems is a clear 
understanding of organizational doctrine, house rules (which we define as expected ways of achieving certain 
goals, carrying out certain instructions) and organizational and individual culture. This is important because 
these elements limit the number of command approaches available per crisis situation. During coalitions, such 
an understanding is crucial so that different organizations can predict what might not work. An important point 
is that there is a need for a learning system that detects human behaviour, and if the outcome is successful adds 
it to a/the? list of house rules. 
Other aspects that are important for command and control in human autonomous collectives are communication 
structures, socially distributed cognition and the role of artifacts in sense making. These have been studied in the 
literature and a brief discussion of these follows, we include these to the list of important aspects for commands 
in collectives to form a successful system during emergency crisis management. It is important at this point to 
add that by a human autonomous systems (or collective, we will use these  terms interchangeably) we mean a 
collection of humans (individuals and organizations) and entities capable of operating autonomously, examples 
are given by “intelligent” data mining programs, stock market exchange programs, as well as physical entities 
such as autonomous vehicles. The term system or collective is to indicate that human and autonomous entities 
are, in these cases, part of a large collaborative effort that must function harmoniously. An example of work 
done on understanding failures in communications during command is given by Asplund and Lundberg (2011); 
where specific aspects of communication are identified as important and their interplay studied, namely 
communication infrastructure, situation awareness, individual and organizational common ground, form and 
content of messages, and communication paths through organizations. The authors propose solutions to some of 
these. We add to the list of possible solutions they already mentioned, which include structure of command, 
intent, methods and goals.  McMaster (2012) studies collaborative sensemaking through means of (both formal 
and informal) artifacts in police emergency response. This contributes to the area of understanding how 
information is shared in organizations taking a distributed cognition approach to it. Their data is gathered from 
studies in two (one urban, one in a rural area) UK Police forces between 2004 and 2010 and it shows the need 
for new ICT technology in police response, and moreover that it is important to take into account existing 
organizational doctrine and culture prior to imposing new technology.  
Another example of work on the study of information exchange in emergency response is given by (Netten and 
Someren 2008); this work focuses on coarse-grained dialogue segmentation. They provide a method, which 
automatically recognizes coherent segments of textual information, exchanged during disasters. The “cut-off” 
points to each segment are based on interpretation by the human user, however once this is done they are 
                                                            1	  The decomposition into intentions will vary according to who does the exercise, so by visible, we mean visible 
to that particular agent or organization.	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automatically recognized. Another important area for achieving efficient command and control, which has 
already been vastly covered in the literature is sensemaking (e.g. (Weick, Sutcliffe, and Obstfeld 2005), (Weick 
1988), (Weick 1993);  (Landgren 2004); (Borglund and Nuldén 2008) and (Faisal, Attfield, Blandford 2009)). 
Temporal Relations of Commands 
Intent 
Doctrine, organizational and individual culture 
Communication Structures 
Sensemaking 
Human Bias 
Flexibility  
Interplay between different features and commands 
Figure 2. Summary of command features 
This classification aims to facilitate the identification of when commands might clash and when command 
approaches are inappropriate to the situation. Moreover, when new commands are issued or even when new 
individual goals appear, this structure should help in predicting their suitability within the whole system.  
CASE STUDIES 
We will now exemplify components of our hypotheses from the previous section in a retrospective analysis of 
some real world case studies; in addition these elements are analyzed in further detail as we apply them to 
understand successes and failures in the case studies. The reader will note that all individuals involved in our 
analysis have been mentioned anonymously.  
A major failure in the command system during the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina was a rigid allocation of roles 
and inflexibility in command approach.  Organizations and individuals have a set of command approaches to 
choose from, this set is bounded by doctrine of organization, culture and personal goals and intent, as well as 
organizational goals and intent.  Each individual and each organization has a structure of goals and intents they 
wish to follow, some are more important than others, some are allowed to occur concurrently whereas others are 
co-dependent or dependent of completion of others; similarly to the typology on commands specified in the 
previous section. In complex situations such as during emergency response it is essential that organizations draw 
their structure as accurately, comprehensively and unambiguously as reasonably possible, especially because 
one of the reasons for failure in rescue operations is when these autonomous organizations suddenly have to 
work together. We hypothesise that this failure is due to more than simply “lack of training”, that some of them 
could be prevented by a decomposition of organizational goals, command and intents into a clearly 
understandable set with the typology on commands as classified in Figure 2. 
Human Bias 
Even with such a structure in place, humans are still prone to bias and prejudice which will cause the right 
command to be followed at the wrong time. For example, during the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, local 
police forces had, amongst others, the high level goal of rescuing people and keeping the peace, and it was the 
high level intent of the whole Katrina operation (both official and civilian individuals who interfered) to rescue 
people. An example of this is given by civilian X, who tried to rescue stranded neighbors with a personal canoe 
but was stopped by police who thought he was a acting maliciously (Pilkington, 2010), here the high level intent 
to save lives was blocked by the intent to keep the peace, simply because police officers interpreted X as a 
looter/potential terrorist.  
Understanding (or lack thereof) of the interplay between commands and other elements and the overall 
structure of command and intent 
A successful example of a clear understanding of the overall structure of command and intent leading to an 
appropriate selection of intents and goals lying in the intersection of “most important “ and “most relevant to 
current situation” is that observed in the behaviour of Sergeants A and B. When they heard the news of the 
hurricane, they borrowed a boat and contacted their commanding officer, who gave them the necessary 
permission to proceed to New Orleans (5 hours away), and assist the Red Cross with its rescue mission. The 
original mission was to rescue those stranded in hospitals and infirmaries, however on the journey they noticed 
people in attics, rooftops and cars and opted to rescue them instead. An understanding of the cooperation of 
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commands and how the overall intent here prevailed over the lower level intent the marines had to follow during 
their mission caused them to alter their behaviour in a way that lead to the successful rescue of trapped citizens 
(Murphy 2005).  
Flexibility: Limitations due to complexity 
The creation of a structure with the typology as described becomes increasingly difficult with an increase in 
complexity of the situation.2 
For example, one can contrast Katrina with the 2001 attack on the Pentagon and the 1995 Oklahoma City 
bombings (Moynihan 2007) and notice that a lower complexity of the two last mentioned events allowed for a 
quick assignment of, amongst other things, command roles. The command approaches were sufficiently flexible 
to break the traditional hierarchical imposition; nonetheless a centralized command structure was established, as 
required in the ICS (incident command system). In the pentagon, federal organizations did not impose their 
authority. An example of the opposite causing a clash between federal and local authorities is given by the case 
of a federal organization (see (Interview 2005)) cutting their emergency communication lines of a local parish, 
causing a local authority to reconnect the line and post armed guards so that no one could disconnect them again. 
This can also be used as a motivating example for the need of the aforementioned structure of command, goals 
and intents. Although one thing to note is that since it was unclear the reason behind federal organization’s 
decision to cut the lines, there might be more complexity layers to this story. In that case, this is a motivating 
example that such a structure can highlight when a clash might occur (a simple example is federal agency 
imposing their authority and the local authority imposing their right to keep their communication lines opened) 
but it does not provide a mechanism for avoiding it. The creation of such a mechanism is beyond the scope of 
this paper, but we would expect that collective decision rationale studies would provide good insight to the 
design of clash avoidance solutions. 
In the Pentagon case, there was a general perception of there having been clashes between federal and local 
organizations and a proper authority not being established, despite the formal mechanisms to achieve this. This 
is a good example of how important it is for the system of commands to be a learning system which robustly 
adapts to new ways of achieving goals and intents even by breaking house rules, these new methods if 
successful should become part of the house rules. One thing to note is that we are deliberately not talking about 
how to say that one method is quantifiably better than another; we think this can be given a very simple of 
solution by saying: if the new method is not worse than the expected method, it gets added to the list of known 
methods (or house rules). That way we skip the complexity issues that arise in trying to quantify these 
components, but acknowledge that such a simple solution might not be appropriate to all circumstances. 
Flexibility in assigned command roles 
A good example of flexibility in assigned command roles is given by what happened in the aftermath of the 
2001 attack on the Pentagon. The assistant chief of Fire Department X arrived at the scene before his 
commanding chief and took command and control over the situation; the chief of the Fire Department arrived 
shortly after and opted not to relieve his assistant chief from command. Moynihan (2007) attributes a lot of the 
success in this particular operation to the flexibility in commander’s roles pre-imposed by the ICS procedure. 
We hypothesise that as well as a flexibility in command roles pre-imposed by the command system, the success 
of the management of this particular crisis was facilitated by a correct choosing of the right command approach 
at the right time (from a set limited by conditions already explored above), and due to sensible human decision-
making. For example, the assistant chief opted out of a traditional choosing for incident commanders from his 
own organization, and instead placed officers from other departments in places where he thought would benefit 
from their particular expertise. Unlike the Oklahoma city bombings (in which there was a protective reaction of 
officers with regards to their role towards federal organizations), the assistant chief chose to incorporate them 
into the command structure; for example, he said “On our incident, I knew I wanted to know where FEMA3 was 
all the time, and I figured the best way to do that, as well as get their expertise, was to have them up there with 
me in the command post. I was just looking for practical solutions. I didn’t want something that some book said 
you shouldn’t do getting in the way of what I thought was the best way to deal with this” (Varley 2003). 
Breaking house rules as to how key officers are typically placed in authority positions and how to incorporate 
federal organizations into a local response should be automatically incorporated into the system as house rules, 
given their success, and then added to the acceptable set of command approaches; this neatly exemplifies what 
                                                            
2 A detailed description of what entails complexity with regards to crisis management is beyond the scope of 
this paper. However, we note that complexity could be measured as a mixture of number of stakeholders, 
number of agencies involved, degree of geographic distribution of agencies and geographic distribution of the 
disaster/catastrophe/etc. itself, level of warning before major incidents, amongst others. 3	  FEMA stands for Federal Emergency Management Agency	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we mean by a learning system. 
The case of command hand over is not an isolated one; there are examples (Case Studies 2012) of Fire and 
Rescue Service teams handing command over to a private organization to restore back order in incidents such as 
a tank colliding and spilling oil in a motorway, a tank venting steam of acetic acid in a brewery. There are also 
examples of incidents being immediately tended to by a private organization; for example when a manufacturing 
company accidentally released engine oil into a storm drain. As already noted, the ICS protocol has a high level 
of flexibility in command built into it, but nonetheless it requires the formation of a centralized command and is 
thus not appropriate for all situations. This type of centralized command seems to work well with multi-
organizations cooperation of a relatively small scale or within an organization, for example Bigley and Roberts 
(2001) observed the successful installment of the ICS in a California fire department. Further we have observed 
that it requires a quick installation of “leaders”, but typically it comes down to human nature whether the 
flexibility of “who is in charge” will be accepted or not. So this approach might not translate as well to multi-
organization situations of high complexity requiring a more distributed or an emergent type of command.   
We have examined how an increase in complexity is proportional to difficulty in establishing certain key aspects 
of command in collectives. The reader must note however that this is just an untested thesis and further 
comparative work on this type of centralized command protocols must be done for conclusive results to be 
drawn.  
 
Beyond complexity: other considerations  
We now analyse two aspects that seem independent on the complexity of the system. 
 
Lack of understanding of goals and intents 
There are certain components that seem to be independent of complexity. For instance, the inability for multiple 
autonomous agencies to work collaboratively still fails even in local and contained disasters4 of less complexity 
(as compared to Katrina), such as the 1995 Oklahoma City bombings (Moynihan, 2007). Members of a police 
force noted that their department was unprepared to incorporate all the volunteers into their missions, and no 
accepted procedure to deal with donated material was put in place. A member of the Red Cross coordinating 
team noted similar unpreparedness to deal with the “overwhelming” number of volunteers.  We stand by our 
thesis that this could be facilitated by laying out the structures we have specified and sharing them amongst all 
stakeholders. In addition each individual involved should similarly structure his/her own intent and goals and 
analyse them against the organizational ones and the higher level “system” structures.  
 
A clear understanding of necessary goals and intents, house rules: when the right command structure 
meets the demands of the system’s capability 
For another successful command story, we refer the reader to the case of Civilian Y, (Montoya, 2007), an ex-
marine who was amongst hundreds of people trapped in a building; he successfully set up command and 
organized food distribution, protection to all good-intending residents as well ensuring their evacuation. We 
suggest that this particular situation called for a hierarchical, hero emergent type of command, and so the right 
command structure was chosen in the right circumstance, at the right time. His previous military experience and 
large, imposing figure probably made him an ideal candidate to become a leader for the apartment complex; no 
other type of command structure would have been appropriate. In addition, his obtaining of power was 
facilitated by people in the building being scared and seeking an authority figure as a means to relive them of 
some responsibility for decision making during the crisis. A similar successful example of the right command 
structure meeting the demands of the system’s capability (again in this case an emergent hero type) can be found 
in (Rodríguez, Trainor and Quarantelli 2006).  An emergent group, consisting of eleven friends, searched for 
survivors and food to re-distribute to those in need; they came up with their own rules such as no bodies were to 
be retrieved, only survivors and no weapons were to be carried. Interestingly the group had informal cooperation 
understandings with the police and the National Guard, for example these organizations passed them ready 
meals to distribute as well as survivors who wished to evacuate. They had been childhood friends and the 
familiarity amongst teammates made it possible for the group to emerge and develop its own doctrine rapidly. 
The fact that the National Guard and the police were willing to form an ad-hoc coalition with a non-official team 
shows flexibility in the system and if the system is to learn new behaviour, then this should certainly be one.  
There has been considerable work on teamwork and how to improve this type of cooperation and coordination 
amongst individuals in these groups, see for example (Gibson and Zellmer-Bruhn 2001); (Morey et al. 2002); 
(Tremblay et al. 2012). We end with a success story; on Sunday 11 December 2005, an oil storage facility, the 
                                                            4	  By disaster we mean any human or natural incident requiring multiple agencies coordinated emergency 
response and pay no attention to the classifications into catastrophe, disaster, etc. seeing as they differ according 
to culture. 
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Hertfordshire Oil Storage Terminal, near an English motorway, the M1 saw a series of explosions that 
eventually took down twenty large storage tanks (report 2011). The response to this particular crisis situation 
has been quoted as an example of how the bronze –silver –gold command structure (McCann 2009) is defined. 
The structure was created in 1985 and has been applied at different incidents since. The fact that the system had 
been placed in practice a few times contributed to its success; this is similar to the American ICS, which was 
created in 1968.  
CONCLUSION 
We have identified a few key aspects of command in collectives that must be present for the capability of a 
system of emergency response to be achieved. By no means are we claiming that this list is comprehensive, we 
have pursued a detailed analysis of some elements, inspired by literature and our own thinking, and have tested 
these against case studies. The appearance of new technology and the constant evolution seen in human nature 
means that this list will never be truly comprehensive; nonetheless one can hope to keep it as up-to-date as 
possible through further analysis of case studies and potential field work. Our case studies dealt with three 
different types of commands; distributed, emergent, hierarchical. This is by no means a fully comprehensive list, 
but even such a stringent division has allowed us to confirm that different approaches to command are required 
in different situations even when the same organizations are involved. This suggests that organizations need a 
high degree of flexibility in command when cooperating with other stakeholders. We have also observed some 
limitations to each command approach, for example doctrine and culture of organizations and individuals 
involved, time constraints, differing goals, intent. This suggests the need for all stakeholders to create a structure 
of goals, intents and have clearly defined doctrines so that these can be shared at the system level ensuring that 
only “reasonable” command methods are put forward. It is unrealistic to expect that a subset of this structure 
would generate common goals, intents, etc. but the hope is that by drawing it as a causal dependency relational 
set, once can predict which components might clash and create a rationale for solving conflicts before they arise. 
A next step in this work will be the creation of a formal grammar, which would build on the current command 
grammar used in the military; so that it encompasses our working definition of command in collectives. This 
should be done without deviation from regular grammars, in order to ensure whatever language built on the 
grammar can be automated and enhance human-autonomous system communications. One possible starting 
direction is in the work done in developing the language IEML (Lévy, 2006) for collective intelligence research. 
This encompasses many of the desired notions and is being build for a more general setting than the grammars 
built in the military setting which are mainly aiming at time-bounded military missions; whereas we wish to be 
able to deal with command in a more general, “on-going” dynamic and complex setting. 
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